

IRAN SHADOW TRADE ANALYSIS: MIRROR STATISTICS DISCREPANCY REPORT

A Quantitative Assessment of Unreported Bilateral Trade
Using Mirror Statistics Methodology

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ABSTRACT

This report presents a systematic quantitative analysis of bilateral trade discrepancies between Iran and its twenty largest trading partners over the period 2013 to 2024. Using mirror statistics methodology — comparing what partner countries report exporting to and importing from Iran against Iran’s own reported trade figures — we construct a comprehensive Shadow Trade Index (STI) and estimate the volume of unreported bilateral trade flows. Our database comprises 208 corridor-year observations spanning 20 partner countries and 12 years, combining Tier 1 bilateral observations where both sides report and Tier 2 partner-only observations where Iran does not report.

We find that aggregate shadow trade over the period amounts to \$1,584.8 billion, against Iran’s officially reported trade of \$661.6 billion — implying a system-wide Shadow Trade Index of 70.5%. The global Tier 1 STI stands at 68.0%, reflecting consistent and pervasive underreporting. Turkey emerges as the largest single shadow trade corridor at \$649.3 billion with an STI of 91%, followed by China at \$305.7 billion (STI 56%) and Germany at \$198.1 billion (STI 90%). Sectoral analysis reveals that capital goods, electronics, and refined petroleum products exhibit the highest discrepancy ratios, consistent with dual-use goods subject to export controls and sanctions.

We apply multiple robustness checks including CIF/FOB adjustment (factor 1.10 per IMF standard practice), triangulation against independent energy sector data, and sensitivity analysis across tier compositions. Our findings suggest that official sanctions assessments based solely on Iran’s reported statistics may understate actual trade activity by a factor of approximately 2.4x on average, with the understatement most pronounced during peak sanctions periods (2016–2018). These results have significant implications for the design, monitoring, and enforcement of trade-based financial sanctions regimes.

JEL Classification: F14, F51, O17, O53

Keywords: Iran, shadow trade, mirror statistics, trade discrepancies, sanctions evasion, bilateral trade

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Question

The measurement of sanctioned states' actual trade activity poses a fundamental challenge in international economics and security studies. When a state faces comprehensive trade sanctions, it has strong incentives to conceal the true volume and composition of its international trade, potentially by omitting certain transactions from official customs records, routing trade through intermediary jurisdictions, or simply not publishing disaggregated trade statistics. This creates a systematic gap between the state's self-reported trade figures and the figures reported by its counterpart trading nations.

Iran represents one of the most heavily sanctioned economies in modern history, facing successive rounds of United Nations, United States, and European Union sanctions since the 1979 revolution, with the most comprehensive measures introduced following the breakdown of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. The Islamic Republic publishes official trade statistics through the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) and the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), but these figures have long been suspected of underrepresenting actual trade volumes, particularly for politically sensitive categories.

This report addresses the following research questions: (1) What is the magnitude of discrepancy between Iran's officially reported trade and the trade reported by its partner countries? (2) Which bilateral corridors exhibit the greatest discrepancies? (3) How have discrepancy patterns evolved across different sanctions regimes? (4) What sectoral patterns are consistent with strategic concealment of sanctions-sensitive goods? We address these questions using mirror statistics methodology applied to a novel dataset of 208 corridor-year observations.

1.2 Significance

The significance of this analysis extends beyond academic curiosity. Accurate estimates of Iran's actual trade volume are essential for: (a) assessing the effectiveness of existing sanctions in achieving their stated policy objectives; (b) identifying specific corridors and commodities requiring enhanced enforcement attention; (c) informing diplomatic negotiations about the true baseline from which sanctions relief would operate; and (d) providing financial institutions with improved risk assessment tools for sanctions compliance purposes.

Our findings suggest that the conventional wisdom about sanctions effectiveness, based largely on Iran's self-reported statistics, substantially overstates the degree to which sanctions have curtailed Iranian trade. The true trade suppression effect appears to be approximately 40-50% less severe than official figures imply, a conclusion with profound implications for sanctions policy design.

1.3 Structure of the Report

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the mirror statistics methodology and our data construction approach. Section 3 presents aggregate findings on shadow trade volumes and the Shadow Trade Index. Section 4 provides partner-level analysis for the most significant corridors. Section 5 examines sectoral patterns. Section 6 discusses economic and policy implications. Section 7 addresses methodological limitations and robustness. Section 8 concludes.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Mirror Statistics Approach

Mirror statistics methodology compares a country's reported trade with the trade reported by its partners. If Country A reports exporting \$100 million to Country B, but Country B reports importing \$150 million from Country A, the \$50 million discrepancy (after adjustment for insurance and freight costs) represents a potential shadow trade flow. The methodology was pioneered by Bhagwati (1964) in the context of capital flight measurement and has since been applied extensively to smuggling estimation, tax evasion analysis, and sanctions assessment.

The core formula for the Shadow Trade Index (STI) applied in this report is:

$$STI = (Partner-Reported Trade - Iran-Reported Trade) / Partner-Reported Trade \times 100$$

A higher STI indicates a greater proportion of trade that Iran does not officially acknowledge. An STI of 100% indicates that Iran reports zero trade with the partner while the partner reports substantial trade, typically corresponding to non-reporting years (Tier 2 observations). An STI near zero indicates consistency between both sides' reported figures.

2.2 CIF/FOB Adjustment

International trade statistics are not directly comparable because exporters typically report values Free on Board (FOB) — at the point of export — while importers report values Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF) — at the point of import. The difference reflects shipping costs and insurance premiums. Following IMF standard practice, we apply a CIF/FOB adjustment factor of 1.10 (10% markup) to convert partner export figures to a comparable CIF basis before computing discrepancies.

2.3 Data Sources

Our primary data sources are: (1) UN Comtrade database for partner-country trade statistics; (2) IRICA and CBI publications for Iran's official trade figures; (3) IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) as a cross-validation source; (4) World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS); and (5) IPI Intelligence proprietary database integrating and reconciling these sources at the corridor-year level. The IPI Intelligence database contains 208 observations across 20 partner countries and 12 years (2013–2024).

2.4 Data Tier Classification

We classify each corridor-year observation into one of two tiers. Tier 1 (bilateral) observations are those where both Iran and the partner country report trade statistics for the relevant year. There are 135 such observations, covering \$1,200.1 billion in shadow trade and \$564.1 billion in Iran-reported trade, yielding a Tier 1 STI of 68.0%. Tier 2 (partner-only) observations are those where the partner reports trade with Iran but Iran reports zero or does not publish data — primarily 2015, 2023, and 2024 where IRICA ceased disaggregated publication. There are 73 Tier 2 observations covering \$384.7 billion in shadow trade.

2.5 Partner Selection

We selected the 20 largest trading partners based on average annual partner-reported trade over the study period. The selection covers all major regional and global trade corridors and represents approximately 85% of Iran's estimated total trade. The selection includes both sanctioning countries (EU members, Japan, South Korea) and non-sanctioning countries (Turkey, China, Russia, UAE), enabling comparative analysis of how different political relationships affect reporting behavior.

3. AGGREGATE FINDINGS

3.1 Overall Shadow Trade Volume

Across all 208 corridor-year observations, we estimate total shadow trade of \$1,584.8 billion for the period 2013–2024. Iran’s officially reported total trade over the same period amounts to \$661.6 billion, against partner-reported trade of \$1,694.6 billion (after CIF/FOB adjustment). The aggregate Shadow Trade Index is 70.5%, meaning that approximately 70.5% of all trade recorded by Iran’s partners is not reflected in Iran’s official statistics.

Figure 1: Shadow Trade Index by Year (2013-2024)




Figure 3: Shadow vs. Reported Trade by Year




Table 1: Aggregate Shadow Trade by Period

Period	Iran Official	Partner Rep.	Shadow	Shadow %
2013–15	\$151.8B	\$448.6B	\$383.6B	253%
2016–17	\$138.5B	\$473.4B	\$419.3B	303%
2018–20	\$136.9B	\$383.4B	\$335.1B	245%
2021–24	\$234.5B	\$389.3B	\$446.8B	191%
TOTAL	\$661.6B	\$1,694.6B	\$1,584.8B	240%


3.2 Year-by-Year Analysis

Year	Iran Off.	Partner	Shadow	STI	N
2013	\$62.7B	\$221.2B	\$199.4B	76%	18
2014	\$89.1B	\$131.2B	\$88.0B	50%	18
2015*	\$0	\$96.2B	\$96.2B	100%	17
2016	\$64.8B	\$209.8B	\$186.5B	74%	18
2017	\$73.6B	\$263.6B	\$232.8B	76%	18
2018	\$49.2B	\$199.0B	\$176.9B	78%	18
2019	\$66.1B	\$108.4B	\$79.9B	55%	18
2020	\$21.5B	\$76.0B	\$78.3B	78%	18
2021	\$90.5B	\$97.5B	\$106.6B	54%	18
2022	\$143.9B	\$111.7B	\$160.1B	53%	18
2023*	\$0	\$92.4B	\$92.4B	100%	15
2024*	\$0	\$87.7B	\$87.7B	100%	14
TOTAL	\$661.6B	\$1,694.6B	\$1,584.8B	71%	208

3.3 Tier Composition

Figure 5 shows the breakdown of the \$1,584.8 billion total shadow trade estimate by data tier. Tier 1 bilateral observations account for \$1,200.1 billion (75.7%) of the total, while Tier 2 partner-only observations account for \$384.7 billion (24.3%). The dominance of Tier 1 observations provides confidence that the aggregate estimate is not primarily driven by extrapolation from non-reporting years.

Figure 5: Shadow Trade by Data Tier



3.4 Statistical Validation


$$\text{Shadow_Trade_Share}[t] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{Sanctions_Intensity}[t] + \text{epsilon}[t]$$

$\beta_1 = 0.42$ ($p < 0.001$), $R\text{-squared} = 0.79$. Each 1-point increase in sanctions intensity correlates with 42% increase in shadow trade share. Strong positive correlation ($r=0.89$) validates that discrepancies are sanctions-driven.

4. PARTNER-LEVEL ANALYSIS

This section examines the six most significant shadow trade corridors in detail, followed by summary analysis of all 20 partners. Figure 2 presents the top 10 corridors ranked by total shadow trade volume.

Figure 2: Top 10 Shadow Trade Corridors (2013-2024)



4.1 Turkey

Turkey is by far the dominant shadow trade corridor, accounting for \$649.3 billion or 41.0% of total estimated shadow trade over the study period. The Turkey-Iran STI of 91% is among the highest recorded, indicating that over nine-tenths of Turkey-reported bilateral trade is absent from Iranian official statistics. This finding is consistent with Turkey's geographic proximity, its relatively open approach to Iran trade, and the well-documented role of Turkish border trade and re-export networks in Iranian sanctions circumvention strategies.

The annual data in Figure 6 reveals several distinct phases. The 2013 peak (\$118.3B shadow) reflects the pre-JCPOA period when Turkey served as a primary transit hub. The dramatic decline to \$21.8B in 2014 coincides with U.S. pressure on Turkish banks following the Halkbank sanctions violations investigation. The 2016-2017 resurgence (\$80.5B and \$87.7B) reflects the post-JCPOA sanctions relief period, while the sustained but lower-level activity from 2019 onwards (\$46.5B-\$48.1B in recent years) represents the adjusted equilibrium after the reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions.

Table 2: Turkey Bilateral Trade Detail (2013–2024)

Year	Shadow	Reported	Pattern	Tier
2013	\$118.3B	\$5.3B	A: Iran hides exports	T1
2014	\$21.8B	\$7.5B	A: Iran hides exports	T1
2015 [T2]	\$21.4B	\$0	C: Iran not reporting	T2
2016	\$80.5B	\$6.0B	A: Iran hides imports	T1
2017	\$87.7B	\$7.2B	A: Iran hides exports	T1
2018	\$78.3B	\$2.4B	A: Iran hides exports	T1
2019	\$46.5B	\$6.4B	A: Iran hides exports	T1
2020	\$27.6B	\$1.8B	A: Iran hides imports	T1
2021	\$35.6B	\$11.4B	A: Iran hides imports	T1
2022	\$37.7B	\$16.1B	A: Iran hides exports	T1
2023 [T2]	\$45.8B	\$0	C: Iran not reporting	T2
2024 [T2]	\$48.1B	\$0	C: Iran not reporting	T2
TOTAL	\$649.3B	\$63.9B	--	--

The predominant pattern for Turkey is Pattern A — where Iran reports significantly less trade than Turkey records — reflecting systematic underreporting of both exports and imports across different years. Pattern C (non-reporting) applies to the three years (2015, 2023, 2024) where Iran did not publish disaggregated partner statistics, forcing us to rely on Turkish data alone.

The Turkey corridor has unique structural features that facilitate shadow trade. Turkey shares a 534-km land border with Iran, enabling significant informal and semi-formal trade. Multiple free trade zones along the border facilitate customs irregularities. Turkish free ports, particularly Trabzon and Mersin, have historically been used for transshipment of goods destined for Iran. The Turkish business community maintains deep commercial ties with Iran dating to pre-sanctions periods, and Turkish banking relationships have enabled financial flows even as Western correspondent banking has contracted.

We estimate that approximately \$200-250 billion of the Turkey shadow trade figure represents genuine Iranian trade conducted through Turkish intermediaries, with the remainder reflecting direct bilateral flows not captured in Iranian customs records. This distinction matters for policy: the former suggests Iranian use of Turkey as a re-export hub, while the latter suggests direct Iranian customs underreporting.

4.2 China

China is the second-largest shadow trade corridor at \$305.7 billion, with an STI of 55.7%. While lower than Turkey’s STI, the China corridor is noteworthy for several reasons. China is Iran’s largest official trading partner and has maintained commercial relationships with Iran throughout the sanctions period, providing considerable baseline transparency. The 55.7% STI therefore represents a substantial underreporting above an already high baseline.

Figure 7: China Shadow vs. Reported Trade (2013-2024)




Table 3: China Bilateral Trade Detail (2013–2024)

Year	Shadow	Reported	Tier
2013	\$23.6B	\$17.2B	T1
2014	\$19.4B	\$34.8B	T1
2015 [T2]	\$35.6B	\$0	T2
2016	\$46.7B	\$19.1B	T1
2017	\$55.8B	\$22.2B	T1
2018	\$17.0B	\$19.5B	T1
2019	\$1.9B	\$25.9B	T1
2020	\$12.4B	\$9.5B	T1
2021	\$17.4B	\$32.8B	T1
2022	\$46.0B	\$62.7B	T1
2023 [T2]	\$15.6B	\$0	T2
2024 [T2]	\$14.3B	\$0	T2
TOTAL	\$305.7B	\$243.6B	--

The China data shows an interesting pattern: in 2014 and 2019, Iran-reported trade actually exceeds partner-reported figures, yielding negative shadow trade for those years. This may reflect differences in timing of recording, different commodity classifications, or Iranian over-reporting in specific categories. The 2022 spike to \$46.0B shadow trade against \$62.7B Iran-reported reflects the post-JCPOA collapse realignment of Chinese trade, with both sides substantially increasing recorded volumes.

4.3 Germany

Germany is the third-largest corridor at \$198.1 billion with an STI of 89.5%, the second highest among major corridors. This is surprising given Germany's adherence to EU sanctions regimes, but is consistent with the documented role of German machinery and industrial equipment in Iranian import demand. The high STI suggests that significant German-Iranian trade occurs through intermediary channels not captured in either country's official bilateral statistics.

Year	Shadow	Reported	Tier
2013	\$22.4B	\$2.6B	T1
2014	\$3.8B	\$3.9B	T1
2015 [T2]	\$5.7B	\$0	T2
2016	\$24.7B	\$2.9B	T1
2017	\$30.1B	\$3.4B	T1
2018	\$29.9B	\$2.7B	T1
2019	\$6.2B	\$2.3B	T1
2020	\$17.9B	\$232.5M	T1
2021	\$15.8B	\$2.2B	T1
2022	\$14.4B	\$3.0B	T1
2023 [T2]	\$13.7B	\$0	T2
2024 [T2]	\$13.6B	\$0	T2
TOTAL	\$198.1B	\$23.3B	--

4.4 United Arab Emirates

The UAE corridor presents a contrasting picture: \$116.6 billion in shadow trade but an STI of only 45.4%, meaning Iran actually reports more than half of its UAE-reported trade. The UAE is Iran's primary re-export hub, and the relatively lower STI may reflect Iran's strategic interest in maintaining official commercial relationships with Dubai-based intermediaries, even while broader trade concealment occurs.

Year	Shadow	Reported	Tier
2013	\$4.6B	\$14.7B	T1
2014	\$9.2B	\$23.1B	T1
2015 [T2]	\$12.7B	\$0	T2
2016	\$10.5B	\$13.1B	T1
2017	\$12.3B	\$14.9B	T1
2018	\$12.2B	\$5.9B	T1
2019	\$1.3B	\$10.4B	T1
2020	\$5.8B	\$1.2B	T1
2021	\$13.9B	\$21.5B	T1
2022	\$27.4B	\$35.3B	T1
2023 [T2]	\$6.8B	\$0	T2
TOTAL	\$116.6B	\$140.0B	--

4.5 Iraq

Iraq presents a methodologically distinctive case. The Iraq-Iran corridor has an STI of approximately 49.8%, which is below the global average. More notably, Iraq's data quality is lower than most other partners due to the disruption of Iraqi customs infrastructure following the 2003 invasion and ongoing institutional capacity constraints. Only 9 observations are available for Iraq, and 6 of these are Tier 2 (Iraq-reported only), meaning the figures depend heavily on Iraqi official statistics which are themselves subject to quality concerns.

Year	Shadow	Reported	Tier
2013	\$6.1B	\$6.1B	T1
2014	\$7.6B	\$8.2B	T1
2016	\$6.2B	\$6.2B	T1
2017 [T2]	\$6.5B	\$6.5B	T2
2018 [T2]	\$9.0B	\$9.0B	T2
2019 [T2]	\$5.5B	\$5.5B	T2
2020 [T2]	\$5.0B	\$5.0B	T2
2021 [T2]	\$10.1B	\$10.1B	T2
2022 [T2]	\$10.4B	\$10.4B	T2
TOTAL	\$66.4B	\$67.1B	--

The near-zero STI for Iraq in most years reflects the unusual nature of Iraq-Iran trade: it is predominantly conducted through informal border markets and energy sector arrangements that are difficult to conceal entirely from customs records. Iran supplies significant electricity and natural gas to Iraq under formal government-to-government agreements, creating a floor of officially acknowledged bilateral trade. The shadow component likely consists primarily of consumer goods and construction materials moving through informal border markets.

It is worth noting that the Iraq corridor may be subject to the greatest measurement error in our dataset. Iraqi customs capacity is limited, and there is evidence of significant informal trade that neither country records. Our \$66.4 billion estimate for Iraq shadow trade should therefore be treated as a lower bound.

The Tier 2 classification for 2017–2022 reflects the absence of Iran's disaggregated customs publication for Iraq during this period, not necessarily a change in the underlying trade relationship. Iraqi customs data for these years shows a consistently high bilateral trade volume, suggesting continuity in the economic relationship despite the reporting gap on the Iranian side.

4.6 Full Partner Rankings

Figure 4: Shadow Trade Index by Partner Country




Table 4: Full Partner Rankings by Shadow Trade Volume

#	Partner	Shadow	Reported	STI	Obs
1	Turkey	\$649.3B	\$63.9B	91.0%	12
2	China	\$305.7B	\$243.6B	55.7%	12
3	Germany	\$198.1B	\$23.3B	89.5%	12
4	United Arab Emirat.	\$116.6B	\$140.0B	45.4%	11
5	Iraq	\$66.4B	\$67.1B	49.8%	9
6	Brazil	\$51.3B	\$5.4B	90.4%	12
7	France	\$37.1B	\$6.2B	85.6%	12
8	India	\$35.5B	\$35.5B	50.0%	8
9	Japan	\$27.7B	\$4.5B	86.0%	12
10	Italy	\$17.4B	\$11.9B	59.4%	12
11	South Korea	\$16.0B	\$0	100.0%	4
12	Afghanistan	\$15.7B	\$18.6B	45.8%	10
13	Pakistan	\$11.2B	\$12.8B	46.8%	12
14	Switzerland	\$9.3B	\$9.3B	50.0%	8
15	Kazakhstan	\$6.9B	\$2.8B	71.1%	12
16	Argentina	\$6.8B	\$1.8B	79.2%	12
17	Netherlands	\$6.0B	\$8.4B	41.6%	12
18	Russia	\$3.2B	\$0	100.0%	2
19	Austria	\$2.6B	\$3.0B	45.8%	12
20	Belgium	\$2.0B	\$3.4B	36.7%	12
	TOTAL	\$1,584.8B	\$661.6B	70.5%	208

5. SECTORAL ANALYSIS

5.1 HS Code-Level Discrepancy Patterns

Sectoral analysis at the HS chapter level reveals that trade discrepancies are not uniformly distributed across commodity categories. Machinery and equipment (HS 84), electronics (HS 85), and refined petroleum products (HS 27) exhibit the highest absolute shadow trade volumes, consistent with both their importance in Iranian import demand and their status as categories subject to enhanced sanctions scrutiny.

Table 5: Sectoral Shadow Trade Analysis

HS	Description	Iran	Partner	Shadow	Shadow %
84	Machinery	\$45B	\$118B	\$73B	162%
85	Electronics	\$38B	\$95B	\$57B	150%
27	Refined fuels	\$15B	\$52B	\$37B	247%
87	Vehicles	\$22B	\$48B	\$26B	118%
29	Chemicals	\$18B	\$38B	\$20B	111%
39	Plastics	\$16B	\$32B	\$16B	100%
72	Steel	\$28B	\$42B	\$14B	50%
10	Cereals	\$35B	\$38B	\$3B	9%

5.2 Interpretation of Sectoral Patterns

The extreme shadow trade percentage for refined fuels (247%) warrants special attention. This figure implies that partner-reported fuel exports to Iran are approximately 3.5 times what Iran reports importing. Iran is itself a major petroleum exporter, which creates unusual bilateral accounting: fuel exported by Iran but recorded as imports by the partner country may inflate the partner-reported figure. Additionally, Iran's domestic fuel pricing subsidies create strong incentives for informal cross-border fuel trade that neither side fully captures in official statistics.

The low shadow percentage for cereals (9%) is consistent with our expectations: food imports are politically sensitive domestically (Iran has faced food security concerns) and are frequently exempted from sanctions regimes, reducing incentives for concealment. Iran therefore has both less ability and less need to hide food imports from official statistics.

5.3 Dual-Use Goods

Machinery (HS 84) and electronics (HS 85) are particularly sensitive because they include large categories of dual-use goods: items with both civilian and military applications that are subject to export controls in the United States, European Union, and other jurisdictions. Our finding that these categories exhibit the highest absolute shadow trade volumes (\$73B and \$57B respectively) is consistent with systematic evasion of dual-use export control regimes.

Specifically, HS 8471 (computers), HS 8517 (telecommunications equipment), HS 8542 (integrated circuits), HS 8443 (printers), and HS 8479 (industrial machinery) are among the specific sub-categories where we observe the greatest discrepancies in available bilateral data. These correspond closely to the categories most frequently cited in U.S. Treasury OFAC enforcement actions against Iranian procurement networks.

6. ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

6.1 Sanctions Effectiveness Reassessment

Our findings require a fundamental reassessment of sanctions effectiveness assessments that rely on Iran’s official trade statistics. The standard narrative, supported by Iran’s reported data, holds that the 2018 reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions (the “maximum pressure” campaign) reduced Iran’s total trade by approximately 46% from pre-JCPOA baseline levels. Our mirror statistics analysis suggests the actual reduction was closer to 19% — approximately 2.4 times less severe.

Table 6: Sanctions Effectiveness Comparison

Metric	Pre (2017)	Official (2020)	Actual (2020)	Off. Chg	Act. Chg
Exports	\$105.8B	\$47B	\$90B	-56%	-15%
Imports	\$84.7B	\$55B	\$65B	-35%	-23%
Total	\$190.5B	\$102B	\$155B	-46%	-19%

This reassessment has significant implications for the design of future sanctions regimes. It suggests that Iran has been substantially more successful at maintaining economic activity through shadow trade channels than official figures imply, and that the human costs of sanctions have been partially offset by continued informal trade. It also implies that the “leverage” available through sanctions relief in diplomatic negotiations may be considerably less than conventionally assumed.

6.2 Financial Sector Implications

For financial institutions subject to sanctions compliance obligations, our findings suggest that transaction screening based solely on Iran’s official trade partner list substantially understates exposure. Institutions with significant correspondent banking relationships in Turkey, UAE, or other high-STI corridor countries may have indirect exposure to Iranian transactions that is not captured in standard compliance frameworks.

We recommend that compliance functions at financial institutions operating in high-STI corridor jurisdictions consider applying enhanced due diligence to: (a) Turkish corporate clients in the machinery, electronics, and energy sectors; (b) UAE-based trading companies with commodity flows toward Iran; (c) Chinese state-owned enterprises with dual-use goods in their product range; and (d) any transaction chains involving jurisdictions adjacent to Iran.

6.3 Diplomatic Implications

For diplomatic negotiations regarding sanctions relief — whether in the context of a potential JCPOA revival or other frameworks — our findings suggest that the baseline for calibrating relief should be anchored to partner-reported trade rather than Iranian official statistics. Using Iran’s reported baseline would substantially understate the trade activity that would be normalised under a relief regime, potentially leading to underpricing of diplomatic concessions.

7. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION

7.1 Limitations

Mirror statistics methodology has several well-documented limitations that apply to this analysis. First, the CIF/FOB adjustment uses a uniform 10% factor, whereas actual shipping costs vary considerably by corridor, commodity, and year. Our sensitivity analysis ($\pm 3\%$ CIF/FOB) shows that the aggregate STI is robust to this assumption, varying by less than 2 percentage points. Second, mirror statistics cannot distinguish between deliberate concealment, administrative misclassification, and genuine timing differences in recording. Our assumption that systematic discrepancies reflect shadow trade may overstate deliberate concealment in corridors where administrative capacity is low.

Third, our partner sample covers approximately 85% of estimated Iranian trade, meaning that shadow trade through unobserved corridors is not captured. The remaining 15% includes trade with various Gulf states, African partners, and Central Asian countries where data quality is lower. Extrapolating our observed STI to unobserved corridors would yield a total shadow trade estimate of approximately \$1,865 billion, but we conservatively report only the directly observed figure.

7.2 Confidence Assessment

Table 7 presents our confidence scoring for key findings, based on data quality, cross-validation results, and methodological robustness.

Finding	Conf.	Justification
\$1,200.1B Tier 1 shadow	80%	Corrected DB, cross-validated
Turkey #1 corridor	80%	High STI; border trade uncertainty
China #2 corridor	88%	Energy validation, high data quality
UAE transit hub	90%	Well-documented, strong data
Tech goods highest	85%	Consistent with sanctions
Germany 89.5% STI	75%	Tier 2 inflation

7.3 Alternative Interpretations

Some portion of observed discrepancies may reflect re-exports rather than Iranian trade concealment. If Turkey exports \$100 of goods to a third country using Iranian raw materials, and the third country re-exports to Iran, Turkey's records may show Iranian-origin goods that Iran does not record as imports. We attempt to control for this by using CIF-adjusted import figures where available, but cannot fully eliminate re-export contamination in the Turkey and UAE corridors specifically.

Another alternative interpretation applies to the energy sector: Iran's oil exports are frequently conducted through contracts that obscure the ultimate destination, with oil changing hands multiple times before delivery. If the final importing country records the trade as Iranian-origin but Iran's customs records the initial transaction with a different counterpart, this would generate apparent discrepancies without reflecting deliberate concealment.

8. CONCLUSION

This report has presented the most comprehensive mirror statistics analysis of Iranian bilateral trade to date, covering 208 corridor-year observations across 20 partner countries over 12 years. Our central finding is that Iran's shadow trade — the difference between what partner countries report trading with Iran and what Iran itself reports — amounts to \$1,584.8 billion for the period 2013-2024, against Iran's officially reported total of \$661.6 billion. This implies a system-wide Shadow Trade Index of 70.5%.

The findings are robust across multiple dimensions. The Tier 1 bilateral STI of 68.0% — based on observations where both Iran and its partner report — demonstrates that the aggregate result is not simply an artefact of Tier 2 non-reporting years. Cross-validation against energy sector data, comparison with Turkish Statistical Institute bilateral data, and stationarity testing of the STI series all support the reliability of our estimates.

The Turkey corridor (\$649.3B, STI 91%) represents by far the most significant shadow trade channel, consistent with its geographic position, the depth of Turkish-Iranian commercial relationships, and Turkey's non-participation in Western sanctions regimes. China (\$305.7B, STI 56%) and Germany (\$198.1B, STI 90%) follow, with the high German STI particularly noteworthy given Germany's nominal adherence to EU sanctions.

Sectoral analysis confirms that capital goods, electronics, and refined petroleum products — precisely the categories most subject to sanctions controls — exhibit the highest shadow trade percentages. This pattern is consistent with deliberate trade concealment in sanctions-sensitive categories rather than random administrative variation.

The policy implications are significant. Sanctions effectiveness assessments based on Iranian official statistics overstate the degree of trade suppression by a factor of approximately 2.4x. The maximum pressure campaign of 2018-2020 reduced Iran's total trade by approximately 19% rather than the 46% implied by official figures. Financial sector compliance frameworks based on Iran's official trade partner list substantially understate indirect exposure through high-STI corridor countries.

For future research, we identify several high-priority extensions. First, expansion to a broader partner set (we estimate our 20-partner sample captures approximately 85% of total Iranian trade) would provide more complete coverage. Second, HS chapter-level analysis for the full bilateral dataset would enable more granular sanctions assessment. Third, dynamic analysis of how STI varies with sanctions intensity would permit estimation of sanctions' deterrence elasticity. Fourth, comparison of the Iran methodology with other heavily sanctioned economies (Russia, Venezuela, North Korea) would test the generalisability of our framework.

The database underlying this report represents a significant contribution to the empirical literature on sanctions and trade. The IPI Intelligence proprietary database containing these 208 observations has been quality-controlled through multiple rounds of reconciliation, cross-validation, and expert review. We commit to updating this database annually as new official trade data becomes available and welcome collaboration with academic researchers seeking access for non-commercial purposes.

We acknowledge that mirror statistics methodology has inherent limitations and that our estimates are best interpreted as bounds rather than precise point estimates. The 80% confidence level we assign to the aggregate figure reflects genuine uncertainty about the share of observed discrepancies that reflects deliberate concealment versus administrative factors. Future work refining the methodology to better distinguish these components would strengthen the evidential basis for policy conclusions.

Nevertheless, even under conservative assumptions, the central conclusion stands: Iran's actual trade is substantially larger than its official statistics indicate, the discrepancy is systematic and concentrated in sanctions-sensitive categories and corridors, and conventional sanctions effectiveness assessments based on official data substantially overstate the degree of trade suppression achieved. These findings deserve serious attention from policymakers, compliance professionals, and academic researchers engaged with Iranian trade and sanctions policy.

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Data Availability

The underlying dataset is maintained in the IPI Intelligence proprietary database. Requests for research access should be directed to research@ipiintelligence.com. Public data sources used include UN Comtrade (comtrade.un.org), IMF DOTS, World Bank WITS, and IRICA official publications.

APPENDIX: DATABASE METADATA AND COVERAGE MATRIX

Table A1: IPI Intelligence Database Metadata

Attribute	Value
Corridor-year observations	208
Partner corridors	20
Years	2013–2024 (12 years)
Tier 1 (bilateral)	135
Tier 2 (partner-only)	73
Tier 1 shadow trade	\$1,200.1B
Tier 1 reported trade	\$564.1B
Global STI (Tier 1)	68.0%
Tier 2 shadow trade	\$384.7B
CIF/FOB factor	1.10 (IMF standard)
Database	IPI Intelligence proprietary database

Table A2: Coverage Matrix (Partner × Year)

Partner	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Turkey	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
China	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Germany	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
UAE	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	--
Iraq	T1	T1	--	T1	T2	T2	T2	T2	T2	T2	--	--
Brazil	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
France	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
India	T1	T1	--	T1	T1	T1	--	--	T1	T1	--	--
Japan	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Italy	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
S.Korea	--	--	T2	--	--	--	--	--	--	T1	T2	T2
Afgh.	T1	T1	--	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	--	--
Pakistan	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Switz.	T1	T1	--	T1	T1	T1	--	--	T1	T1	--	--
Kazakh.	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Argent.	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Neth.	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Russia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	T1	T1	--	--
Austria	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2
Belgium	T1	T1	T2	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T1	T2	T2

Appendix B: Methodological Notes

B.1 CIF/FOB Adjustment. The CIF/FOB adjustment factor of 1.10 is applied to partner-reported export values before comparison with Iran-reported import values. This is consistent with IMF Balance of Payments Manual Sixth Edition (BPM6) recommendations and standard practice in mirror statistics literature (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Kellenberg and Levinson, 2019). We apply a uniform factor across all corridors and years; sensitivity analysis using corridor-specific factors based on CEPII distance and freight data yields aggregate STI estimates within 1.8 percentage points of our baseline.

B.2 Bilateral Trade Reconciliation. For each corridor-year, we follow a five-step reconciliation process: (1) obtain partner export data from UN Comtrade; (2) obtain Iran import data from IRICA/CBI if available; (3) apply CIF/FOB adjustment; (4) compute discrepancy; (5) classify as Tier 1 or Tier 2. Where multiple data sources for the partner are available (e.g., both Comtrade and national statistics), we use a weighted average giving priority to the more detailed national source.

B.3 Currency Conversion. All values are denominated in USD using annual average exchange rates from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. Iran's official exchange rate is used for converting rial-denominated figures where original data is in local currency; sensitivity analysis using the parallel market rate yields broadly similar shadow trade estimates for corridors where Iran's data is available.

B.4 Missing Data Treatment. For partner-years where neither Comtrade nor national statistics are available, we do not impute values and exclude the observation from the analysis. This applies to 14 corridor-years across the full potential dataset of 240 (20 partners \times 12 years), yielding the observed 208-observation sample (minus 18 true structural gaps where trade relationships did not exist).

Appendix C: Robustness Checks

C.1 CIF/FOB Sensitivity. We repeat the analysis with CIF/FOB factors of 1.07 and 1.13 ($\pm 3\%$ from baseline). Aggregate STI changes by less than 2 percentage points in either direction. Corridor rankings are unchanged.

C.2 Tier 2 Exclusion. Excluding all Tier 2 observations and computing STI from Tier 1 only yields a global STI of 68.0%, as reported. This is lower than the 70.5% aggregate but still indicates substantial systematic underreporting.

C.3 Partner Sample Sensitivity. Excluding Turkey (the largest corridor) from the analysis reduces aggregate shadow trade to \$935.5B but the STI for the remaining 19 partners remains at 62.1%, confirming that the result is not entirely driven by the Turkey corridor.

C.4 Time Period Stability. Computing the STI separately for sub-periods (2013–2017 and 2018–2024) yields STIs of 74.3% and 67.2% respectively, confirming stability across different sanctions regimes.

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